Comments

WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA:
ON THE BRINK OF FULL COMPENSATION

Since the 19th century, California courts have mechanically denied recovery for mental anguish damages in wrongful death actions, despite strong policy reasons to the contrary. This Comment
discusses the inconsistencies that exist when outdated legal doc-

trine precludes compensationfor a recognized, legitimate element
of damages, and proposes that mental anguish damages be recognized in wrongful death actions. Additionally, this Comment explores the concept of "hedonic value" and its potential application

in wrongful death damage assessment.

INTRODUCTION

The decedent was a loving husband and devoted father of three.'
His nine year marriage, which had produced a close-knit family, ended abruptly when he was killed at age thirty-three in an air crash.'
Despite the family's sudden, tragic loss, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal reiterated the harsh rule that damages for
grief and sorrow are not recoverable in an action for wrongful death.
Though confronted with the argument that the awardable damages
were "out-of-touch with 20th century reality," the court responded
that the doctrine of stare decisis4 compelled its conclusion. Wrongful
death decisions for the last century 5 have echoed the same refrain:
Damages for mental anguish6 are not recoverable in California.
I. The factual scenario arose out of Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983).
2. Id. at 518-19, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
3. Id. at 519, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
4. Id.
5. See Dickinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 727, 158 P. 183 (1916); Bond v.
United R.Rs., 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 366 (1911); Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534,
55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966).
6. The term "mental disturbance" is used to encompass fright, shock or other
mental or emotional harm and resulting physical consequences. W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
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Although the California Supreme Court has been hailed as the
most creative, progressive judicial body in the United States,7 it has
refused to reassess its justification for denying wrongful death
mental anguish claims in light of modern negligence precepts. As
wrongful death scholar Steven Speiser wrote, "[t]he reasons for denial of mental anguish damages in death cases have long ago disappeared, but the rule lingers on as an historical anomaly." 8
Wrongful death damages have been examined carefully by writers, especially as tort law has grown to acknowledge the authenticity
of mental or emotional suffering. 9 One notable analysis is provided
by coauthors Speiser and Malawer, 10 who argue persuasively for universal recognition of mental anguish damages in death actions. Judicial and legislative response has been hesitant,11 indicating a willingness to cling to long accepted and well known principles rather than
to incorporate much needed change.
California common law provides an appropriate backdrop for discussion of the existing inconsistencies in the law of wrongful death
damages. Recent California developments have provided courts with
the legal resources necessary to more fully compensate wrongful
death plaintiffs. This Comment's objective is to identify reasons
founded in policy and law that require recognition of mental anguish
damages in death actions. Further, this Comment will discuss the
possibility of complete reform of wrongful death damages based
upon new economic theory concerning the value of human life.

R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 359-60 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Courts and writers have used the terms
"mental and emotional disturbance," "mental and emotional distress" and "mental
anguish" interchangeably to describe all forms of psychic damage. No uniform identifiable meaning seems to have been attached to each phrase, and careful reading of opinions and articles can lead to confusion.
This Comment will refer to "mental anguish" as a subcategory of mental disturbance,
defined as follows: "[A]s a ground for divorce or damages or an element of damages,
[mental anguish] includes the mental suffering resulting from the excitation of the more
poignant and painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation,
wounded pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889
(5th ed. 1979).
7.

8.
9.

10.
Bereaved
11.
tions. Id.
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Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981).
1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:55 (2d ed. 1975).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 360.

Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damagesfor Mental Anguish of
Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
In 1976, eight states allowed mental anguish damages in wrongful death acFourteen states now allow such damages. See infra notes 111-12.
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BACKGROUND

The Evolution of Wrongful Death Damages
12
an 1808 English
Lord Ellenborough's ruling in Baker v. Bolton, development in
law
common
case, has controlled wrongful death
"[I]n a civil Court, the3
England and the United States. He stated,
of as an injury."' 4
complained
death of a human being [can] not be
Baker standard,
the
adopted
Courts throughout the United States
no recovery for
statute,
of
in the absence
cementing the notion that,
15
wrongful death existed.' 6
in 1846, laid to rest
Lord Campbell's Act,' passed by Parliament
The statute allowed benefithe rule of Baker v. Bolton in England.
action in which the jury
ciaries of the deceased to bring a separate
survivors' injury. Althe
to
could award damages proportional
and seemed to afford the
though the language of the Act was broad
courts quickly restricted the
jury a great deal of discretion, English
scope of awardable damages.
Act, Lord ColerSix years after the passage of Lord Campbell's
8 ruled that wrongful death
Co.,'
idge, in Blake v. Midland Railway
loss" limitation, and on9
damages would be subjected to a "pecuniary
for injured emotions.'
that basis denied the plaintiffs compensation
Pecuniself-contradictory.
is
The Blake court's reasoning, however,
estibeing
of
capable
damages
ary damages are defined as those
20 Thus, imposing a pecuniary
mated in, and compensated by, money.
to restate the function of
loss limitation served no purpose other than
elements to monetary
the jury - to reduce legitimate damage
the Blake reafollowing
terms. Nevertheless, courts and legislatures
12. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
13. id.
to providing recovery. See Cross v.
14. Early American courts were not opposed
began to follow the Baker v. Bolcourts
as
However,
Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794).
S. SPEISER, supra note 8, §
generally
See
ton holding, those early decisions were ignored.
1:4.
a common-law right of action. See
15. Hawaii, however, created and retained
Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209 (1860).
of Persons Killed by Accidents, 9 & 10
16. Act for Compensating the Families
Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
although the conduct resulting in death
17. Id. Beneficiaries were allowed to sue

was a felony.

18. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
41-42. For more historical detail, see
19. Id. at 93, 111, 118 Eng. Rep. at 35, of Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful
Analysis
An
Past:
the
Note, Blind Imitation of
Death Actions, 49 DENV. L.J. 99 (1972).
ed. 1979).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th
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soning construed pecuniary loss to mean a death beneficiary's expectation of future monetary benefit, 21 thereby
preventing recovery for
mental anguish and other legitimate damage
In 1862, the California Legislature enacted elements.
the state's first wrongful death statute,22 which allowed the jury
to
award
those pecuniary
and exemplary damages deemed fair
and
just
under
the circumstances. In 1873, the words "pecuniary
moved from the statute, an amendment and exemplary" were reday.23 The current section 377 of the that remains in effect toProcedure reads, in pertinent part, "[iun California Code of Civil
every action under this section, such damages may be given as under
all the circumstances of
the case, may be just .. "24
Although the language of the wrongful
restriction on damage awards other than death statute imposed no
California courts imitated the judicial a requirement of fairness,
conservatism of the earlier
English courts. The pecuniary loss limitation
was quickly adopted,
appearing in California Supreme Court
opinions
as early as 1890. In
Munro v. Pacific Coast Dredgingand
Reclamation Co., 5 a wrongful
death action was brought after an individual
was killed by defendant's negligent blasting.28 Relying upon
Blake
v. Midland Railway
Co., 27 the court allowed damages for
plaintiff's pecuniary loss and
for the loss of comfort, society, support
and protection of the de21. Id. at 1018.
22. An Act Requiring Compensation
for Causing Death by Wrongful Act,
Neglect, or Default, 1862 Cal. Stat. 447.
23. See Code Amendments 1873-1874,
ch.
383,
§ 40. For a history of the amendments to the wrongful death statute, see
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377
(West 1973) and
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering
24. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377 1972).
(West Supp. 1986) provides:
When the death of a person is caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his or her heirs or personal representatives
on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the
the death of such wrongdoer, againstperson causing the death, or in case of
wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies the personal representative of such
injured. If any other person is responsiblebefore or after the death of the person
the action may also be maintained againstfor any such wrongful act or neglect,
such other person, or in case of his
or her death, his or her personal representatives.
In every action under this
section, such damages may be given as
under
may be just, but shall not include damages all the circumstances of the case,
recoverable under Section 573 of
the Probate Code. The respective rights
of the heirs in any award shall be
determined by the court. Any action brought
by the personal representatives of
the decedent pursuant to the provisions
of
Section
573 of the Probate Code
may be joined with an action arising
brought pursuant to the provisions of out of the same wrongful act or neglect
suant to the provisions of this section this section. If an action be brought purand
same wrongful act or neglect be brought a separate action arising out of the
of the Probate Code, such actions shall pursuant to the provisions Section 573
be consolidated for trial on the motion
of any interested party.
25. 84 Cal. 515, 24 P. 303 (1890).
26. Id. at 517, 24 P. at
27. See supra notes 18-21305.
and accompanying text.
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ceased. However, the court ruled that damages for mental anguish

were too vague and uncertain to be recoverable, noting that permit-

ting recovery for grief, sorrow and mental suffering would allow the

28
jury an opportunity to return wild, excessive verdicts. In a subse-

quent decision, the California Supreme Court clarified that recovery

for comfort, society, support and protection also was limited to pecu-

niary value.2 9 The resulting Munro doctrine governed California decisions for the next eighty-one years.30

Adherence to a strict Blake "pecuniary" standard for recovery of
clearly intangible items caused confusion both to juries and to lower
courts. Opinions containing circular language and reasoning abound.
One court stated, "It is not possible to measure in exact terms of
money the loss which a surviving husband, wife, or child may have
sustained through being deprived of the comfort and society of the
deceased . . .

But in fixing the amount, the jury is always bound

by the fundamental rule that pecuniary damage is the limit of recov"3...
31 However, this artificial pecuniary standard began to
ery .
lose its meaning as courts expanded the scope of recoverable damages to include advice and training, 2 family closeness,3 3 warmth of
feeling between members of the family,3 4 and the kind, loving character of the deceased. 5
In 1977 the California Supreme Court in Krouse v. Graham36 acknowledged that certain aspects of wrongful death damage awards
were not pecuniary in nature:
To direct the jury, on one hand, to limit plaintiff's recovery to pecuniary
losses alone while also compensating the plaintiff for loss of such nonpecuniary factors as the society, comfort, care and protection of a decedent is
calculated to mislead and invite confusion. Instead, a simple instruction exof grief and sorrow in wrongful death actions will
cluding considerations
37
normally suffice.
28. Munro, 84 Cal. at 524-25, 24 P. at 305.
29. Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 47 P. 139 (1896).
30. See, e.g., Parsons v. Easton, 184 Cal. 764, 195 P. 419 (1921); Burk v. Arcata
& Mad River R., 125 Cal. 364, 57 P. 1065 (1899); Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. Ry., 118
Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897); Estate of D'India, 63 Cal. App. 3d 942, 134 Cal. Rptr. 165
(1976); Fields v. Riley, I Cal. App. 3d 308, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1969); Zeller v. Reid, 38
Cal. App. 2d 622, 101 P.2d 730 (1940).
31. Dickinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 727, 731, 158 P. 183, 185
(1916)(emphasis in original).
32. Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966).
33. Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
34. Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1967).
35. Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R., 60 Cal. 604 (1882).
36. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
37. Id. at 69, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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Although the court allowed recovery for some nonpecuniary loss,
the opinion, without adequate explanation, denied recovery for
mental anguish damages.
Krouse has become the cornerstone case for modern assessment of
wrongful death damages in California. The California Book of Approved Jury Instructions reflects the Krouse standards; juries are directed to award reasonable damages for loss of love, companionship,
comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support, loss of enjoyment
of sexual relations and loss of assistance in the home. However, juries may not award damages for grief or sorrow suffered by wrongful
death plaintiffs. 8
Damages for Mental Anguish
The unusual history of wrongful death damages inhibited the possible development of a common law right of recovery for mental
anguish. Writers have stated convincingly that had courts not refrained from fashioning common law remedies, developments in
wrongful death actions probably would have paralleled those in personal injury actions.3 9 Although Lord Campbell's Act did not prevent courts from acting independently, a belief persisted after Baker
v. Bolton that recovery for wrongful death was not permitted at
common law.40
The statutory origins of wrongful death law in California indicated a legislative intent to leave the issue of damages to judicial
discretion. California courts were presented with an opportunity to
correct the injustice of Baker v. Bolton; instead, judges tied themselves to English historical coattails.
RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS:

Dillon AND Molien

California courts have had a rich legacy of revolutionizing tort law
concepts. In particular, personal injury cases indicate the willingness
of California jurists to expand recovery for mental disturbance damages. Nonetheless, this forward-looking approach has not been utilized in assessing damages in wrongful death actions. Speiser and
Malawer wrote, "[J]uries are permitted to consider and quantify the
damaging effects of mental anguish in personal injury cases, but are
prohibited from even considering mental anguish of bereaved relatives in most American wrongful death cases . .

.

The authors concentrated on Dillon v. Legg,42 decided in 1968. In
38.
39.

2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 14.50 (7th ed. 1986).
See generally Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 2-8; C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 363-64 (1935).
40. See Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 8.

41.

42.
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Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 2.

68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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Dillon, the California Supreme Court allowed a woman to recover
for emotional distress suffered when she witnessed her daughter's
death. The court asserted that the decision released state law from
its nineteenth century chains.43 Though Dillon expanded the field of
potential plaintiffs, the holding limited recovery to those who experienced a physical manifestation of distress, a requirement imposed at
the time for all emotional distress victims." In 1980, the California
distress plaintiffs
Supreme Court again acted on behalf of emotional
45
the plaintiff
Molien,
In
in Molien v. Kaiser FoundationHospitals.
was negliillness
alleged that his marriage failed after his wife's
4
6
of action
cause
a
that
gently diagnosed as syphilis. The court held
a
without
distress
would lie for negligent infliction of emotional
47
showing of physical injury.
The two landmark decisions are distinguished by the respective
plaintiffs: Dillon allowed recovery to bystanders experiencing emosensory observance of
tional distress as a result of contemporaneous
48
negligently inflicted harm toward another; Molien permitted emotional distress recovery for foreseeable "direct" victims of an actor's
negligence.49
court interThe cases differ in another significant way. The Dillon50
confining
"trauma,"
preted emotional distress to mean "shock" or
disturmental
of
the term to the more readily perceivable aspects
phrase
the
bance. Although the Molien court used similar language,
"emotional distress" was construed more broadly: "[T]he attempted
distinction between physical and psychological injury merely
cloud[ed] the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether
the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should
not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification
scheme." '
The Molien court abolished the distinction between physical and
psychological injury by allowing recovery for emotional distress in
the form of mental anguish. The court stated, "[I]t is rational to
anticipate that both husband and wife would experience anxiety, sus43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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picion, and hostility52 when confronted with what they had every
reason to believe was reliable medical evidence of a particularly noxious infidelity. 53
After Dillon and Molien, plaintiffs could expect compensation for
the entire range of mental disturbance injuries; the difficulty lay only
in classifying plaintiffs as bystanders or direct victims. Goodwin v.
Reilly,54 a recent appellate court opinion, held that to state a valid
cause of action as a direct victim, the plaintiff must allege facts
showing a relationship with the physically injured party such that
the tort has been committed against plaintiff himself. Under this formulation, wrongful death beneficiaries clearly may be viewed as direct victims. When an actor's conduct causes death, bereaved relatives are unquestionably foreseeable; because the injury has resulted
in death, if emotional distress has been inflicted, grieving survivors
are the only possible recipients.
One court has implicitly recognized wrongful death beneficiaries
as emotional distress victims. In Sesma v. Cueto,55 parents brought
concurrent actions for emotional distress and wrongful death when,
as a result of medical malpractice, their child died at birth. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal focused upon the Molien principle
that negligently administered medical care could be directed not
only to the patient, but also to the patient's spouse. The court extended the principle to include the parents of a patient, holding that
both the father and mother could allege facts to state a Molien direct victim cause of action."6
Although Sesma potentially has broadened the meaning of "direct
victim," it does not suggest that courts will apply the Molien criteria
to wrongful death actions in the future. The narrow Sesma holding
allowed recovery to wrongful death plaintiffs only when the defendant has engaged in medical malpractice, and only in a companion
suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress. One year later, in
Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,57 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal rejected an argument, based on both Molien and Sesma, to
extend mental anguish recovery to plaintiffs in a wrongful death action. The court denied recovery because the plaintiffs failed to plead
an indepedent cause of action for emotional distress, and because
emotional distress damages are not recoverable in an action for
52. Anxiety, suspicion and hostility are three "poignant emotions" which
be
classified in the "mental anguish" subcategory of mental disturbance. See supramay
note 6.
53. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
54. 176 Cal. App. 3d 86, 98, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374, 380 (1985).
55. 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982).
56. Id. at 116-17, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
57. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983). See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
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wrongful death.5 8
The reasoning of the Canavin court is internally inconsistent, yet
the case probably marks the line beyond which the direct victim concept will not reach. However, further expansion of Molien may not
be necessary in order to compensate wrongful death beneficiaries for
mental anguish. Another line of California cases provides an established basis for compensating the emotional upheaval accompanying
the death of a loved one.
POST-MORTEM ANGUISH

Prior to Molien and its progeny, California courts required a physical manifestation of emotional distress in order to ensure claim validity.5 9 Prosser and Keeton noted that a physical manifestation was
not required by courts in two special circumstances: cases involving
negligent transmission of a message announcing death and those
concerning negligent mishandling of a corpse.6 0
58. Id. at 520, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court stated:
Preliminarily, Molien and [Sesma] are inapposite, because the Canavins
neither pleaded an independent cause of action for personal injury based upon
emotional distress arising from PSA's negligent killing of decedent, nor alleged
they had suffered any damage as a result of grief and sorrow. Neither did they
offer to amend their pleadings to state an action for emotional distress.
The Canavin court's reasoning reflects the difficulties courts have encountered in attempting to justify the denial of mental anguish damages in death actions. The court
here did not dismiss the possibility of recovery for emotional distress; instead, the court
inferred that the plaintiffs could prevail in a separate action for emotional distress. Unfortunately, all of the legitimate damages suffered by the family were not compensable in
the most appropriate forum - the wrongful death action.
The court continued,
More basically, Molien is inapposite because emotional injuries to the heirs are
not relevant to a cause of action for wrongful death. "Rather, the measure of
damages [in a wrongful death action] is the value of the benefits the heirs
could reasonably expect to receive from the deceased if [he or] she had lived
.... " In other words, "[ilt is the probable value of the decedent's life to those
for whom the action is brought .... " It does not include the value of the
independent, non-derivative effects of the loss of the decedent upon the heirs.
Id., 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court's statement here is based upon language in Syah v.
Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966), which stated, "The measure of
damages in a wrongful death case is the amount the heirs were receiving at the time of
the death of the decedent and what such heirs would have received had the decedent
lived." Id. at 546, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (emphasis added). The Canavin court ignores the
italicized words and fails to recognize the invasion of the heirs' right to mental tranquility - destroyed by the absence of the decedent. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. The court simply errs in labeling mental anguish "independent" and "non-derivative"; the death of the decedent is a cause in fact of the heirs' mental anguish - "but
for" the death of the decedent, the heirs would not have suffered emotionally.
59. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 925, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
60. PRossER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 362.
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Although no message transmission cases have been decided in California, two appellate decisions have made clear that mishandling of
a corpse gives rise to a cause of action for survivors' emotional dis1 detress. The first, Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary,"
cided in 1959, awarded damages for mental and emotional distress
to children who became ill upon discovering that their father's improperly preserved body had been damaged in shipment. 2 The complaint asserted that damages occurred as a result of defendants' negligence. Because the plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered physical
manifestations of distress, the
court held that a question of fact ex63
isted for jury consideration.
Twenty-one years later, a second case firmly established the legal
precepts governing recovery for corpse mishandling. In Allen v.
Jones,6 4 the plaintiff sued a mortuary to recover for mental distress
suffered when his brother's cremated remains were lost in transit
while in the defendant's care. 5 The court acknowledged California
decisions awarding damages for mental distress for the breach of a
mortician's service contract, 6 and held that the plaintiff stated a
cause of action in tort.67 Justice Tamura wrote for the majority:
We conclude that damages are recoverable for mental distress without

physical injury for negligent mishandling of a corpse by a mortuary. Public
policy requires that mortuaries adhere to a high standard of care in view of
the psychological devastation likely to result from any mistake which upsets
the expectations of the decedent's bereaved family. 8

The court accepted the Restatement of Torts position that rejected
the supposed property basis of the cause of action,69 recognizing that
the plaintiffs stated a claim for mental distress alone. 70
Four months before the California Supreme Court decided
Molien, the Allen court applied the principle of recovery for negli61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
P.2d 915
67.
68.
69.

168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959).
Id. at 43, 335 P.2d at 182.
Id.
104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
Id. at 210, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
Id. at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449; see Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196
(1948).
Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
Id. at 214, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (emphasis added).
Id. at 213-14, 163 Cal. Rptr. 449-50. The opinion refers to section 868 of the

RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS,

which states:

The technical basis of the cause of action is the interference with the exclusive right of control of the body, which frequently has been called by the courts
a "property" or a "quasi-property" right. This does not, however, fit very well
into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for the one purpose of interment or
cremation. In practice, the technical right has served as a mere peg upon which
to hang damages for the mental distress inflicted upon the survivor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 comment a (1977).
70. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 215, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
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gent infliction of emotional distress without physical injury to a
corpse mishandling case. The Allen court, concerned with plaintiffs
already bereaved by the loss of a family member, awarded damages
for the additional anguish suffered as a result of corpse mishandling. 7" The court was able to distinguish and quantify a specific portion of the survivors' mental anguish; the same court would have felt
constrained by precedent and therefore unable to respond if the
death itself had been caused by a tortfeasor's negligence, and the
mental anguish had been claimed in an action for wrongful death.
ANALYSIS

Debate over mental anguish damage awards in wrongful death actions is not new; courts repeatedly have been criticized for their inflexible denial of recovery.72 The Molien court stated that whether a
plaintiff has suffered a compensable injury is a matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact.7 In wrongful death actions, however,
compensation for mental anguish injury always has been rejected as
a matter of law. The rationale, stated in Krouse v. Graham, is that
"[n]othing can be recovered as [solace] for lost feelings" 74 - an
unsupportable position in light of Molien and Allen.
Mental anguish damages clearly have been established as compensable.7 5 Judicial efficiency is frustrated by a system that denies such
damages in a death action, yet satisfies the same claim by the same
plaintiff in a companion suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress.7 The task facing the California judiciary is one of acknowledgment: courts must recognize that strong policies already exist to
support recovery for mental anguish by wrongful death beneficiaries.
Mental anguish should be treated as any other issue in dispute - as
a matter to be alleged and proven by the plaintiff. As Speiser and
71. Allen has provided a basis for large emotional distress damage awards arising
from corpse mishandling. A recent verdict awarded the plaintiff $72,500 when the wrong
body was sent by the mortuary to the viewing. Durr v. Humphrey Mortuary, No. 394204
(Orange Cty. Super. Ct. 1985). A jury in another case awarded a 67-year-old man $1
million in damages for emotional distress suffered when the mortuary switched his wife's
body for the viewing. Thompson v. Palmer d. Whitted & Co., No. 496202-3 (Alameda
City Super. Ct. 1984).
72. See generally S. SPEISER, supra note 8, § 3:55.
73. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
74. Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 69, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
75. See Molien v Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
76. See Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982);
Canavin v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983).
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Malawer stated, "Substantial grief should not be assumed to result
automatically from the death of any relative, nor should it be excluded arbitrarily .

. .

. In every case, damages for mental anguish

77
should be based upon proper proof."
Unfortunately, courts have had difficulty with proof of mental
anguish in death actions. Allowing awards for such allegedly nebulous injuries as "grief" and "sorrow" seems to create conceptual obstacles for courts, but calculation of mental anguish damages by a
jury is no more problematic than calculation of other intangibles
such as loss of love or companionship. 8 Courts and juries are now
particularly well-equipped to assess intangible damage elements due
to the availability of scientific and psychological data and expert testimony.79 Attorney and psychiatrist Joseph T. Smith stresses that expert testimony is invaluable to the jury function: "A duly qualified
expert can explain the nature of mental suffering, of the grieving

process .

. .

. When the jury understands the psychological reason-

ing and when it believes in the reality of the phenomenon, it is more
likely to award appropriate damages."'80
Cases such as Dillon and Molien suggest that California courts
have come to trust the judgment capabilities of modern juries, but
the greatest obstacle to wrongful death damage reform still may be
the concern expressed in the 1890 Munro decision - that juries, left
to their own devices, will produce extravagant awards. 81 However,
77. Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 22.
78. S. SPEISER, supra note 8, § 3:55.
79. See, e.g., Werchick, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS
L. 263 (1965); Holmes & Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, I I PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 213 (1967); Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL 7
(July 1977).
80. Smith, The Expert Witness: Maximizing Damagesfor Psychic Injury, 18
TRIAL 51, 52 (Apr. 1982). Dr. Smith emphasizes that an expert witness can help guide
the jury to decide the amount of damages to award to the particular plaintiff:
The expert witness not only can present the broad theory of grief, bereavement,
and stressful life events embraced by modern psychiatry and psychology, but
also can place the individual client somewhere within this framework ....
IT]he same event will have a different impact on each and every individual
... . The lawyer who works together with a psychiatrist or psychologist will
be able to put together a complete and convincing case for damages for suffering and mental pain. Psychiatrists can present the effects of loss on the quality
of the life of the survivor in graphic terms, whether the survivor's reaction be
normal or pathological. Only in this way can we assure that survivors of such
losses collect the full amount of damages to which they are entitled.
Id. at 55.
81. Emphasis on fear of runaway jury verdicts was minimized in Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), but the court made note
of it, quoting Bond v. United R.Rs. of San Francisco, 159 Cal. 270, 285, 113 P. 366, 372
(1911): "[I]t is evident to us, however, from the cases that have come before us, that it
often leads to extravagant verdicts in which the jury, in fact, allow a supposed compensation for sad emotions and injured feelings." Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 68-69, 562 P.2d at
1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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even assuming that juries are incapable of acting sensibly, several
options exist to ensure damage limitation. First, judicial review of
jury verdicts allows courts to verify the reasonableness of damage
awards. The verdict in a wrongful death action is subject to the approval of the trial judge, and on appeal, a reviewing court may intervene if the facts suggest that passion, prejudice or corruption influenced the amount of the award.8 2 But the jury is given deference; the
award will not be8 3disturbed unless it is so disproportionate as to suggest impropriety.
Legislative action is another option to assure reasonable wrongful
death damage awards. Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code
provides that, in medical malpractice actions, damage awards for
noneconomic losses may not exceed $250,000.84 In Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,"5 the California Supreme Court upheld

the constitutionality of section 3333.2: "While the general propriety
of such damages is, of course, firmly imbedded in our common law

jurisprudence . . . no California case of which we are aware has

ever suggested that the right to recover for such noneconomic injuries is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revision." 86 The court recognized that no principle of federal or state law
prevented the legislature from limiting recovery of damages in furtherance of a legitimate state interest.8 7 The state interest involved
in Fein was the concern over rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums, a situation that had reached crisis proportions. 8 A similar worry seems to plague judges in wrongful death actions, " 'a
lively fear [that] the overenthusiasm of sympathetic juries would
lead to excessive awards and increased insurance premiums.'-"9 Because of the perception that juries may tend to favor injured plaintiffs, because defendants generally are insured,90 a legislative cap on
damages might reduce potential judicial and societal concern about
acceptance of mental anguish awards in death actions.
Another available method of preventing windfall recovery is par82. Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
83. Bechtold v. Bishop & Co., 16 Cal. 2d 285, 105 P.2d 984 (1940).
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1982).
85. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
86. Id. at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
87. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
88. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
89. Finkeltein, Pickrel, and Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric
Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884, 885 (1974)
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 907 (4th ed. 1971)).
90. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 590.
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tial modification of the collateral source rule.91 At common law, a
jury calculating damages could not consider insurance payments and
other independent benefits that the plaintiff received to compensate
for the injury sustained.92 The California Legislature in Civil Code
section 3333.1 modified the traditional rule in connection with medical malpractice actions. 93 The effect of the statute was to reduce
damage awards by allowing evidence of plaintiff's net collateral benefits." In death actions, evidence of the heir's wealth or poverty is
inadmissible; damages are assessed based solely upon loss to the beneficiaries.95 An appropriate modification of the collateral source rule
could allow wrongful death defendants to introduce evidence of
plaintiffs' life insurance benefits, but other indications of wealth or
poverty of beneficiaries would remain inadmissible.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to award mental anguish
damages to wrongful death beneficiaries is a practical one: Mental
anguish is a serious form of injury. The Allen court relied heavily
upon Dean Prosser's assessment that, in a corpse mishandling situation, "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress
[exists], arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious." 96 Wrongful death actions
involve a similar guarantee. When the tortious conduct of an individual results in the death of another, the grief suffered by close family
members is undeniably genuine - often it is greater than if the
death had occurred from natural causes. Dr. Smith asserts that the
grief process takes years to complete and that early recovery is not
normal. He states, "The [survivor's] life has been ripped to shreds
and rebuilding is a long and painful process. Significant numbers of
survivors remain depressed long after the original death. 97 In a personal injury case, the victim's relatives may cling to hope, no matter
how slight, for full or partial recovery. Wrongful death beneficiaries
have no such comfort.
The mental anguish suffered by surviving relatives is compounded
by what would seem to be an unresponsive judicial system. 98 Courts
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
Id. at 165, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
Id.
Id. at 165-66, 695 P.2d at 684-85, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
Webb v. Van Noort, 239 Cal. App. 2d 472, 48 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1966).
Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 329-30 (4th ed. 1971)).
97. Smith, supra note 80, at 53.
98. Speiser and Malawer, discussing the injustice of denying mental anguish
damages, state:
[Ilf the bereaved relatives accept [that the law refuses to recognize mental
anguish damages], they can be expected to come away from their experience in
litigation with greatly reduced respect for our legal system. If they do not accept it, and cling to a concept of sentimental or emotional loss, their claims are
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may have a duty to avoid inflicting further damage on plaintiffs
through application of the legal process; courts must at a minimum

provide a remedy for legitimate injury. 9 Prosser and Keeton, dis-

cussing mental disturbance in negligence actions, state, "[T]he law

is not for the protection of the physically sound alone. It is the business of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress,
even if lawsuits must be multiplied. .. .
As discussed, policy reasons do not prevent courts from fully com-

pensating wrongful death plaintiffs. Instead, California courts have
erected a stare decisis barrier that has withstood the most compel-

ling arguments for its elimination. However, the contradiction inherent in denying mental anguish damages in death actions, while allowing recovery for other intangible damage elements, is readily
exposed through careful scrutiny of the Krouse opinion.

In Krouse v. Graham,'0 ' the California Supreme Court reaffirmed

that, under principles of California law, damages for "grief and sorrow" are not recoverable in wrongful death actions. 0 2 At the same
time, the court fully approved an award for loss of society, relying
upon Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet:10 3 "It is greatly persuasive
with us that . . . the [United States] Supreme Court interpreted the
term 'society' as including 'a broad range of mutual benefits each
family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection . .

"104

The Krouse court did not acknowledge, and some courts have rejected, 10 5 the fact that loss of society has the same policy underpinthen very difficult to adjudicate, and the policies of the courts are further
frustrated.
Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 19.
99. Professor Leon Green asserts:
No society could long endure under law that could not be made to respond to
the needs of its members. A court's limitations are largely those that it imposes
on itself. And, if any American court should seek to bind itself by a rule that
would prevent the correction of its errors or the advance of the cause of justice
beyond its former decisions, it would be held in contempt by every other court
and every informed citizen in the country.
Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part II - Judicial Lawmaking, 64 W. VA. L. REV.
115, 140 (1962).
100. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 360.
101. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
102. Id. at 70, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
103. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
104. Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 71, 562 P.2d at 1027, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (quoting
Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 585).
105. See, e.g., Cummins v. Rachner, 257 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
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ning as mental anguish: the right of the individual to mental tranquility. Peace of mind is the result of the benefits derived from the
society of another, as well as the contentment and security06 received from the mere fact of the other's existence. In that sense, the
loss of the loved one's existence deprives grieving survivors of a positive contribution to peace of mind; 10 7 the loss of that contribution is
manifested by mental anguish. Krouse represents an incomplete attempt to provide compensation for loss of mental tranquility. Although the mental disturbance resulting from loss of society is recognized, the most obvious and serious form of disturbance, mental
anguish, remains barred from consideration.
Some courts have recognized that loss of society and mental
anguish are virtually inseparable. For example, in City of Tucson v.
Wondergem,108 the Arizona Supreme Court found inconsistent the
denial of mental anguish damages with the grant of recovery for loss
of companionship, comfort and guidance. The court stated that because loss of companionship and comfort results in sorrow, failure to
permit mental anguish damages would violate notions of fairness.109
In any event, courts' efforts to prevent jury consideration of mental
anguish damages may be in vain. "The juror may find it quite difficult indeed to distinguish a spouse's loss of love from the forbidden
'mental anguish,' with the result, probable in many cases, that substantial awards will be made for intangible losses under one name or
another." 110
State courts and legislatures have begun to accept the propriety of
awarding mental anguish damages in wrongful death actions. Nine
states now have statutory provisions specifically providing for mental
anguish damage recovery;111 five other states have accomplished the
same result through judicial decree. 11 2 Despite fears of runaway jury
106. The state of mind fostered by the existence of a relative is not necessarily
limited to feelings of contentment and security. Clearly, the continued life of another
may be a source of anxiety, fear, anger, and other unpleasant emotions. Proof of the
plaintiff's completely negative state of mind toward the decedent could be introduced by
the defendant at trial to negate the existence of severe mental anguish.
107. The loss of mental tranquility that gives rise to mental anguish may be analogized to the loss of monetary income that gives rise to undesirable economic consequences. Courts traditionally compensate the latter, even if the economic consequences
are minimal. In comparison, a survivor may feel the residual effects of mental anguish
for years after his or her monetary situation has stabilized.
108. 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970).
109. Id. at 433, 466 P.2d at 387.
110. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 952.
111. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 1985); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
3-904 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02
(Anderson Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-52 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1981).
112. See Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Dobyns v.
Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 119 La. 72, 43 So. 934 (1907); Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines,
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verdicts, statistics indicate that awards and settlements in "mental
anguish" states generally tend to parallel those in jurisdictions that
reject mental anguish damages.1 13
"HEDONIC"

VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE

Wrongful death damage law is far from settled, even in the states
that recognize niental anguish damages. The volatile nature of the
subject is assured, due to the sensitive nature of death and the difficulty involved with placing a value on the loss of human life. While
the debate in California has narrowed to a single aspect of nonpecuniary damages, expert testimony assessing the value of life has persuaded courts in other states to re-evaluate the standards used to
award wrongful death damages.
Some courts have admitted a different type of evidence in wrongful death cases, in an attempt to assess the value of life. For example, in Sherrod v. Berry,11 4 an Illinois federal district court allowed
an economist's testimony concerning the "hedonic" value of human
life. The court noted that legal scholars, economists, and social scientists have struggled, with little success, to formulate a method by
which the value of a human life can be measured in terms understood by a jury. 15 Hedonic value, economist Stanley Smith testified,
referred to the expected pleasure of life, distinct from economic
value, including all the value with which life might be held. 6 The
court accepted Mr. Smith's opinion that the hedonic value of human
life may be worth up to thirty times the economic value of the per671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983); Nohrden v. Northeastern R.R. Co., 59 S.C. 87, 37 S.E. 228
(1900); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
113. Jury awards statistics for 1985 indicate the following average amounts (categorized by type decedent):
"Mental Anguish" states
other states
Children:
Single Adults:
Married Men:
Married Women:
Other decedents:

$658,250
1,034,500
874,714
1,679,574
629,500

$759,420
1,110,957
1,023,150
689,460
245,160

Statistics are based upon data compiled in VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS 8-13 (1986) (Cumulative Index January-December 1985).
114. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. II1.1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987). An
Ohio federal district court in Urseth v. Dayton, No. C-3-84-103 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19,
1986) also has allowed testimony concerning hedonic value of a decedent in a wrongful
death action. Telephone interview with economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
115. 629 F. Supp. at 164.
116. Id. at 163.
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son's life. 117 The court stated, "The fact that the hedonic value of
human life is difficult to measure did not make either [the] testimony or the damages speculative. .

.

.The rule against recovery of

'speculative damages' is generally directed against uncertainty as to
cause rather than uncertainty as to measure or extent." 1118
The Sherrod court's determination to award hedonic value damages represents a bold break from traditional assessment of wrongful
death damages. Hedonic value recovery is an entirely new method of
loss evaluation. Every aspect of damage may be considered as the
jury reaches a lump-sum verdict based not upon an economic entity,
but upon the value of the person as a whole. Damages for hedonic
value -address the more realistic idea that the true injuries to be compensated in wrongful death actions are intangible in nature; the economic loss to beneficiaries is merely one part of the void created by
the death of a loved one.
Hedonic valuation presents an attractive method of achieving full
compensation for wrongful death plaintiffs, but implementation of
the concept poses problems for California and many states. In Sherrod v. Berry, the court awarded damages for hedonic value to the
decedent's father as executor of his son's estate.11 9 California's
wrongful death statute precludes awarding to a beneficiary damages
that are recoverable by the estate.1 20 Damages for hedonic value
may still be recoverable, but not in the form contemplated by Sherrod. Damages awarded in Sherrod reflected the full hedonic value of
the decedent's life that the decedent would have received, had he
lived. An heir in California, to come within the purview of the
wrongful death statute, would have to prove the derivative hedonic
value that he or she would have received from the decedent's life,
121
had the decedent lived.
117. Id. Mr. Smith, when testifying as an expert witness, informs juries that the
total value of a person's life may be expressed as the sum of that person's pecuniary and
hedonic values. Mr. Smith testifies that hedonic value has been measured to be several
hundred thousand to several million dollars. Total economic value has been found to be
consistently greater than and measured up to thirty times pecuniary value alone.
Although hedonic value damages are expressed as a ratio to economic value damages,
the two are assessed separately by a jury and have no interdependence. Mr. Smith testifies that each year of life expectancy has a hedonic value and that as far as economists
can determine the value does not vary from person to person. So, a fifty year old person
with a physical or mental disability has the same hedonic value as a fifty year old person
with no disability. Also, hedonic value for each year remains constant for a person's
entire life span, such that a person with twenty years to live would have exactly four
times the hedonic value of a person with only five years to live. Telephone interview with
economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
118. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 164.
119. Id. at 163.
120. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering 1972).
121. The heir's derivative hedonic value could be expressed as a percentage of the
hedonic value of the decedent. Mr. Smith has not yet completed study on the theoretical
framework of the hedonic value structure; an evaluation of how hedonic value of one
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As long as judges consider themselves limited to granting recovery
for economic damages only, little hope exists for adoption of hedonic
valuation. Courts insisting on exact computation of economic losses
face situations in which the ascertainment of damages becomes as
arbitrary as the forbidden damages that courts refuse to acknowledge. Questions arise, for example, concerning the economic value of
a decedent who was unemployed. Courts are then forced to consider
the person's potential for future employment, the education accumulated to date and that likely to be pursued in the future, and so on.122
The end result is to reduce to a meaningless number the value of the
life of an individual whose economic potential is unknowable. Recovery for hedonic value, while admittedly difficult to ascertain, at least
confronts the inevitable truth that the value of human life cannot
and should not be so crudely quantified.
CONCLUSION

California courts have continued to deny recovery for mental
anguish damages in wrongful death actions despite strong countervailing policy and established law mandating change. This Comment
has concentrated on California wrongful death case law, noting the
inconsistency and unfairness inherent in a system reflecting outdated
principles. The potential exists, however, for progress toward full
compensation for wrongful death plaintiffs; in Krouse v. Graham,
the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that reform can be effected
when the need is recognized.
The general nature of California's wrongful death statute has
placed responsibility for damage development wholly within the
province of the courts. Justice Tobriner recognized the trend toward
complete judicial control, stating, "I find nothing in the statute or its
history which anticipates and forbids the evolution of recovery for
wrongful death into a universally recognized right of common law
123
status.'
The need for further reform in death actions is evident, especially
as substantial damage awards for emotional distress in corpse mishandling and personal injury cases become more commonplace.
Courts should strive for consistency in the law; the unjustifiable rift
person is transmitted to another will be discussed in his forthcoming paper. Telephone
interview with economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
122. Fox v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 565, 184 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1982).
123. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97, 111 (1977) (Tobriner, Acting C.J., concurring).
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between damages allowed in wrongful death actions and damages
allowed in other cases is the epitome of inconsistency. The step toward correction is a small one: the California Supreme Court need
simply declare that juries
124 may award damages for legitimate, established forms of injury.
Although a decision to allow hedonic value damages is not likely
in the near future, recognition of mental anguish damages in death
actions is supported by common law and common sense. Wrongful
death actions represent the culmination of a traumatic emotional experience for the heirs of the deceased. Damage awards must be considered carefully to ensure that deserving plaintiffs are as fully compensated in wrongful death actions as they are in liersonal injury
litigation.
THOMAS

E. COURTNEY, JR.

124. California courts traditionally have been viewed as pioneers in the tort law
field. A California decision to recognize mental anguish damages likely would influence
other courts to do the same. One example of California's influence is the Montana Supreme Court's decision to allow damages for mental anguish. The dissenting justice argued that the court should not recognize such damages because California courts, confronted with a similar wrongful death statute, have refused to grant recovery. Dawson v.
Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983) (Weber, J., dissenting).
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